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Department of State , Along the same lines, Mexico was far from being an enthusiastic promoter of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, because it was considered an instrument for US power. Indeed, a declassified document the US embassy in Mexico sent in February to the State Department noted with some resignation: 'by remaining cool to the U.

Even after the North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect in , when it had become clear that unipolarity was clearly not a fleeting moment in world politics, Mexico did not substantially change its foreign or security policies Curzio , As Michael Dziedzic pointed out at the time: 'defense policy in Mexico responds principally to domestic stimuli While global order has undergone a thorough retrofit, the country's defense policy has not' Dziedzic , For Mexico the relationship with Communist Cuba was part of a triangle.

One vertex represented the nonintervention principle: revolutionary nationalism dictated that Tlatelolco take a maximalist stand regarding the right of Havana on domestic affairs; the second had to do with the country's relationship with the United States: for both normative and pragmatic reasons, Mexico City could not antagonise Washington on such a fundamental matter as the alleged struggle against Communism in the hemisphere; finally, the third vertex referred to the post-revolutionary regime's own interests: keeping a check on Cuban activities in the country would avoid potential political instability.

Again, in March of the following year, the Mexican president informed President Dwight Eisenhower that he agreed with him in that Soviet embassies were centres of subversion and spying, and should therefore be under surveillance; indeed, his administration already practiced such measures, for domestic and international reasonsArchives of the U.

State Department , 3. Similarly, and returning to the Cuba-Mexico-U. As Mexican diplomats had informed their US counterparts the year after the triumphant entry of the rebels in Havana, Mexico was even more concerned than they were about the increase of Soviet influence in Cuba New York Times Less noted than its voting position at Punta del Este, though, is Mexico's Foreign Affairs Minister's speech at the session, which is profoundly revealing of Mexico's appraisal of Communist Cuba.

It is worth quoting a couple of paragraphs at length:. For the first time in the history of the Americas, one of our governments clearly declares that it upholds an ideology and a political system that is totally divorced from the policies that have been the common denominator of institutions of all peoples of the New World.

Even if, on more than one occasion, some of our governments were not faithful to the principles and the norms of representative democracy, never had any of them had declared to uphold a different political philosophy. It thus seems unquestionable that there is a radical incompatibility between belonging to the Organization of American States and upholding a Marxist-Leninist political creed, as it would also be with the upholding of an absolutist monarchical one. With the same energy with which we defend the non-intervention principle for all the peoples, and therefore that of the Cuban people, we assert that being a member of our organization is incompatible with the adoption of a governmental regime whose characteristics are not the ones of representative democracies Manuel Tello in Rojas and Covarrubias , During a meeting with President Lyndon B.

Johnson at his ranch in Texas, the Mexican dignitary assured his counterpart that he 'could be absolutely sure that when the chips were really down, Mexico would be unequivocally by its side' LBJ Library Archives a, 3. An affinity was found between the U. S to control Castro, although the country was very 'sensitive' about publicity regarding such cooperation National Security Archive , Collaboration was not limited to such restrictions, but also included, for instance, photographing each traveller arriving from Cuba State Department Archives Maintenance of relations between Mexico and Cuba obeyed in part to an informal agreement with Washington regarding the advisability of having a member of the OAS with a 'foot in the door' that could be useful to US interests National Security Archive , However, as suggested, beyond cooperation with its the powerful northern neighbour, the Mexican government had its own reasons to play a double game in its relations with Cuba.

For example, in a meeting with Richard Nixon, he explained beforehand the meaning of the speech he would deliver at the United Nations: it was necessary to ratify the Mexican position regarding the role of the Third World, since unless I carry the flag in Latin America, Castro Ruz will capture it'. As Mexico's post-revolutionary identity demanded, the three vertexes of the triangle Communist Cuba represented to the country were kept in balance. Although drug smuggling from Mexico to the United States had been a contentious issue since the s, until the mids it had been managed in a relatively successful and cooperative fashion.

As a result of the closure of the Caribbean routes of cocaine traffickers from Colombia to the U. This phenomenon provoked a series of changes in the modus vivendi of those involved in the world of drugs in Mexico. Drug lords began dividing up the country into zones of control, which no longer followed the terms of the tacit understanding that had prevailed for decades between them and Mexican authorities.

By the mideighties Mexico was a principal supplier of drugs in the United States: it held about 40 per cent of the heroin market and 30 per cent of marijuana Serrano , From Washington's point of view, the situation was to be blamed on Mexico's feeble commitment to the fight against drugs. Camarena ran Operation Padrino, a joint operative whose goal was arresting heroin and cocaine traffickers. Secretary of State George Shultz declared: 'Our level of tolerance has been exceeded by these events, and they [Mexican officials] know that' New York Times As a result of this unfortunate incident, Washington hardened its position on the drug war and in its dealings with Mexico.

In addition, in the Law Against Drug Abuse was passed, and included punitive measures against Mexico, such as the withdrawal of resources a million dollars of assistance in the drug war if Mexico did not provide information on the progress of the Camarena murder case Treverton , That same year the US Congress institutionalised the annual certification process on cooperation in the combat against drug trade, applied to countries working with the United States.

Countries found to be, according to reports received by the US President, participating in the production or traffic of drugs, would not be certified and would be sanctioned by, for example, the suspension of assistance via US programmes. The implication was clear: Mexico, as a source of narcotics, became a threat to US national security. Mexico reacted accordingly. In the de la Madrid administration defined drug trafficking as a 'state mat ter' that constituted a national security threat.

In a joint document, the 'U. That same year both leaders issued the Presidential Declaration on Anti-Drug Cooperation and an extradition protocol was agreed upon. In Mexico and the U. Beyond documents and pronouncements, bilateral collaboration enjoyed its best period in the late s.

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However, the deepening of relations in the struggle against drug trade clearly did not lack setbacks. Just one week before he was arrested, the Mexican General had visited Washington, where he had received a detailed summary of classified information regarding US anti-narcotics strategies Schulz , 18 and Another setback in the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in the struggle against drugs took place a year later.

Casablanca was a flagrant violation not only of Mexican sovereignty and the bilateral agreements shared by the two countries, but also of the climate of trust that had been established by both countries' officials. Despite the commotion caused by the discovery of the Mexican anti-drug Czar's illicit activities and detention, eight months later, at a Senate hearing, McCaffrey would say: 'In the last 2 years the level of cooperation on the drug issue has been phenomenal, to the point that it would clearly By now revolutionary nationalism as state identity was on its way out.

Thus, for instance, the Zedillo administration's six-year plan did not even mention either it or the Revolution, as had been ordinarily been done since the s. Furthrermore, there was a sharp discursive break when in the first administration not belonging to the party in power since the s took office.

There was thus a clear break from past discourse regarding the understanding of state identity. Interestingly, the anti-drug struggle played a less predominant role in Mexico's relationship with the United States at the turn of the century.